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NOTES
Antitrust Law-A Rocky Road for Price Discrimination In North
Carolina
In Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court was given its first opportunity to apply North Carolina antitrust
law to price discrimination. The relationship of the parties involved,
however, partially obscured the problems of price discrimination. Nor-
mally, price discrimination pits the government or the victim of the dis-
crimination against the discriminating seller. In Rose -the favored buy-
er demanded damages from the seller because of the seller's failure
to perform the contract which created the discrimination.
T. W. Rose and J. E. Dooley, owners of the only rock quarries in a
three county area,2 executed two agreements in January 1959 for the sale
of crushed stone. Under the first agreement' Dooley received a ten-
year lease on the Rose quarry. He was not required to operate that
quarry, and in fact, he never mined any stone. Besides a two-cents per
ton royalty on all stone taken from the leased quarry, Rose was to re-
ceive a price advantage on two types of gravel extracted from the leased
mine: twenty-five cents per ton on crusherrun stone and twenty cents
per ton on clean concrete stone. The second agreement gave Rose
similar ten-year price advantages and these differentials were to be
applied to Rose's purchases from the quarry owned by Dooley.4
1. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
2. Record, vol. 15, at 35, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190
S.E.2d 719 (1972).
3. The agreement relative to the Rose quarry specified:
Should the tenant decide to operate the above mentioned quarry he agrees
to sell stone to [plaintiff] F.O.B. this quarry for the following prices:
Crushed run stone at $1.45 per ton
Clean Concrete stone at $1.80 per ton
#11 stone at $2.20 per ton
The tenant further agrees that he will not sell any stone produced at this
quarry to anyone other than the Highway Commission for a price less than
the following:
Crushed Run stone at $1.70 per ton
# 11 stone at $2.20 per ton
Clean Concrete stone at $2.00 per ton
282 N.C. 643, 647, 194 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1973).
4. Another agreement gave similar terms on price for operation of the Dooley
quarry:
Witnesseth, that the seller agrees to furnish the buyer stone F.O.B. the
quarry site at Cycle, North Carolina at the following prices:
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Vulcan Materials Company assumed the contracts with Rose after
it had purchased the Dooley firm. In May 1961 Vulcan informed Rose
that it was equalizing prices to all customers because of buyer discon-
tent and the company's fear of liability.5 Rose protested but paid the
higher price, claiming there was no alternative source of supply.6
When the agreements expired, Rose brought suit for the difference be-
tween the higher price demanded by Vulcan and the contract price.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, reversing a superior court
ruling for Rose, found that the contracts violated both federal and state
antitrust laws' and, thus, could not be enforced. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, held that the court of appeals had incorrectly
interpreted the applicable laws and therefore reversed in favor of Rose.
In analyzing the alleged statutory violations, the supreme court
first held that the price discrimination portion of the Robinson-Patman
Act' did not apply because the defendant had failed to show that any
sale had occurred in interstate commerce.) Turning to state law, the
Crusher run stone at $1.25 per ton
Clean Concrete stone at 1.60 per ton
No. 11 stone at 2.00 per ton...
J. E. Dooley & Son, Inc., agree that they will not sell any stone to anyone
other than the State Highway Commission for prices less than the following
from the Cycle Quarry:
Crusher run stone $1.50 per ton
Clean Concrete stone 1.80 per ton
No. 11 stone at 2.00 per ton
The above restrictions shall apply only to an area of an eight mile radius
of Elkin, North Carolina and shall apply for a period of ten years from the
date of this contract.
Id. at 648, 194 S.E.2d at 525.
5. Record, vol. 15, at 68, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190
S.E.2d 719 (1972).
6. Id. at 53.
7. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 698, 190 S.E.2d 719, 721
(1972).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1970).
9. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), has two jurisdictional pre-
requisites: (1) the seller must be engaged in interstate commerce; and (2) a discrimina-
tion in price must result from the conduct of such interstate commerce. Interpretation
of the second requirement has been uncertain since the Supreme Court decision of
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). Moore implied that resources
acquired in interstate commerce that are used to finance intrastate discriminations would
satisfy the "course of commerce" requirement. Like the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Rose, however, most of the federal courts of appeals have consistently required
proof of a discriminatory interstate sale. See, e.g., Kitner & Mayne, Interstate Com-
merce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 58 Gao. LJ.
1117 (1970). See also Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act,
22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (1971).
The unsettled nature of this issue was demonstrated in Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co.,
456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972). The three-judge panel ruled that an interstate sale was
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supreme court ruled that section 75-5(b)(5) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which had been applied by the court of appeals, did not
cover the conduct of the parties. 10 Since this provision prohibits geo-
graphic discriminations that injure competitors of the seller and since
the proven injuries were only to competitors of the buyer, the court held
that the statute was inapplicable.
The supreme court also rejected the argument that the agreements
were "restraints of trade" under section 75-1 of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes.11 After tracing the history of competitive restraints, the
court concluded that all restrictions not condemned at common law were
to be tested for their unreasonableness. The supreme court further held
that, if particular offenses were not analyzed by the common law courts,
the burden of proving unreasonableness rests on the party asserting il-
legality. Since price discrimination had not been subjected to common-
law review, Vulcan was found to have the burden of proof. However,
the court found that Vulcan had failed to satisfy this requirement. The
not required. This decision received mixed "reviews" from commentators. Compare
Note, Robinson-Patman Act: "In Commerce" Jurisdictional Requirement Broadened, 57
MINN. L. REV. 1035 (1973), ivith 86 HAnv. L. REv. 765 (1973). The Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed the initial decision. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir. 1973). The Tenth Circuit also has rejected this principle. Continental
Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1973). Although
the rule is not absolute, the requirement of an interstate sale will probably remain in
force until specifically changed by the United States Supreme Court.
10. 282 N.C. at 653-55, 194 S.E.2d at 529. Interpretation of section 75-5(b) (5)
demands a careful reading of the statute.
(b) In addition to the other acts declared unlawful by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to do, or to have any contract
express or knowingly implied to do, any of the following acts:
(5) While engaged in dealing in goods within this State, at a place where
there is competition, to sell such goods at a price lower than is charged
by such person for the same thing at another place, when there is not good
and sufficient reason on account of transportation or the expense of doing
business for charging less at one place than at the other, or to give away
such goods, with a view to injuring the business of another.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(5) (1965). The most important limitation on this provi-
sion is a result of legislative drafting: the General Assembly described all of the pro-
hibited activities with reference only to the verb "to sell." The statute therefore applies
only to sellers. The same construction is encountered in the Robinson-Patman Act, and
the limitation to sellers has been held constitutional. United States v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (constitutional attacks on vagueness and due process
dismissed).
Further wording limits the general usefulness of section 75-5(b)(5) even for sell-
ers. Price discrimination traditionally has required two sales; however, this provision
requires two sales in two different regions. Therefore the statute is directed more at
locality discriminations than at general forms of price discrimination. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 17031 (West 1964), applied in Harris v. Capital Records Distnb.
Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 413 P.2d 139, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1966).
11. 282 N.C. at 657-58, 194 S.E.2d at 531.
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court added that even if the pricing agreements were in violation of
sections 75-1 and 75-5(b)(7),12 the decision would not have been
changed because the illegal price to other customers could have been sev-
ered from the legal price to Rose.' 3 The contract was therefore en-
forceable and the trial court's judgment for damages was reinstated.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A prerequisite for evaluating the Rose decision is an understand-
ing of price discrimination, the most complicated trade restraint. Only
a simplistic explanation is possible here. 14 The condemned activities
involve transactions by a seller which "discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality""' and
which economically injure another buyer or seller. Price discrimination,
however, does not depend solely on a price differential. If the differ-
ence in prices charged to various customers reflects decreased market-
ing and production costs or competition, the discrimination is lawful.' 0
This special price, however, must be available to all customers practi-
cally as well as theoretically. 7 The price differential is illegal when
it is the extension of favoritism, a result of competitive power or resour-
ces.
The economic nature of the pricing agreements, therefore, is ex-
12. See note 44 infra.
13. 282 N.C. at 658, 194 S.E.2d at 531.
14. The complexity of price discrimination has produced innumerable evaluations.
Numerous simple explanations can be found; e.g., C. AUSTIN, PRicE DISCRIMINATION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (2d rev. ed. 1959); D.
BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Act (1964). More extensive evaluations are also avail-
able; e.g., C. EDWARDS, THE PRrCE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959); F. ROWE, PRICE DIs-
CRIMINATION UNDER TmE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (1962) (best general authority), Spe-
cial sources exist even for pragmatic applications of the act; e.g., A. SAWYER, BUSINEsS
Asprs OF PRIcING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Act (1963). Other commentators
feel that the problems involved in interpreting price discrimination outweigh the benefits
of attacking the violation. E.g., Austern, Presumptions and Percipience About Competi-
tive Effect Under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARv. L. REv. 773 (1968).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
16. C. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 546-616 (a detailed examination of the major
defenses to charges of price discrimination); Mayer, Affirmative Defenses to Prima
Facie Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 310 (1966).
Many defenses are based on special accounting procedures. See generally H. TAGOAltT,
COST JUSTIFICATION (1959).
17. The need for methods of evaluating pricing structure is demonstrated in FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Morton had a special pricing system that pro-
vided for discounts based on two criteria: single car-load orders and accumulated pur-
chases. The structure seemed to give preferential treatment to a few large buyers. The
Court concluded that the effects of a pricing system are crucial elements that must be
examined. The discounts must be practically available to everyone, not simply theoretic-
ally available. See also United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
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tremely important. The original vertical integration of the Rose com-
pany-a quarry and a cement plant-should have given that firm a com-
petitive advantage. However, if Rose had used his quarry to supply only
his needs for stone, he would have lost valuable economies of scale in
his operations. The cost of internally supplied stone would have been
greater than externally purchased stone. By maintaining regular pro-
duction, Rose could satisfy his cement requirements and sell the excess.
This excess stone competed directly with gravel from the Dooley
quarry. Thus in order to justify regular operation, Rose merely had
to cover his incremental costs of production. This type of competition
was disastrous for Dooley.
Legal analysis of the economic effects in Rose demands initial re-
cognition of one principle: while the contested pricing agreements al-
lowed Dooley to eliminate Rose as a competitor, such a result is not
a violation of North Carolina antitrust laws.' s The special contract
price given to Rose as consideration for the lease of his quarry appears
lawful. 9 Nevertheless, the inclusion of minimum prices that Dooley
18. See Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way, 169 N.C. 679, 86 S.E. 603 (1915).
19. See Texas Gulf Sulfur v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1969). The
plaintiff cited this case, which found no price discrimination, because of its factual simi-
larity to Rose and the nature of the protection bargained for by Simplot, protection from
upward swings in price. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, vol. 15, at 11, Rose v. Vulcan Ma-
terials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190 S.E.2d 719 (1972). The creation of the contract
in Simplot was a natural and sound business decision for a purchaser who depends pri-
marily on one input. However, the contract was not unbalanced: the agreements gave
Texas Gulf a relatively stable demand against which to schedule production, allowing
the company to increase efficiency and reduce cost. In addition, if the market price
decreased, Texas Gulf would be protected within a narrow range.
Rose attempted to secure the same advantage which Simplot acquired in its agree-
ment. However, Rose went further and acquired protection from downward swings in
price. The agreements did not require that Rose purchase stone from Dooley. Rose
had to continue his purchases only so long as he could not secure stone from another
quarry at a price (including the costs of transportation) that was less than the price
charged by Dooley. Meanwhile, the restrictive agreements prevented Dooley from low-
ering his price to retain customers or to attract new purchasers. If prices declined
greatly, Dooley would have no buyers other than Rose. This threat of a shift in orders
gave Rose a bargaining advantage with which he could have obtained new agreements
from Dooley with lower purchase prices for the stone.
The Rose decision can thus be distinguished from Simplot by combining contract
theory and practical economics. First, in Simplot mutual advantages were obtained by
each party in the agreements. In Rose all of the contract provisions benefited Rose.
Dooley obtained his advantages from the economic setting, the creation of a local mo-
nopoly. Secondly, benefits and losses in 'Simplot affected only the parties involved. In
Rose, Dooley was greatly restricted in his pricing decisions during periods of market de-
cline. However, Rose probably would never lose anything. The real "losers" were
Rose's competitors and the eventual consumers. Other purchasers were required to pay
an artificially high price for stone. This excess could either be absorbed or transferred
to the public. In either case the actual burden of the agreements was carried by other
parties.
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could charge other buyers was a basis for claiming unlawful price dis-
crimination.20
The dynamic nature of the pricing agreements should be the basis
for legal analysis. If the market price for crushed stone had fallen,
other cement companies in competition with Rose would have been
forced to absorb transportation costs from distant quarries to compete
with Rose in the Elkin market since the Dooley quarry could not lower
its price because of the agreements. All of the purchasers would have
been on an equal footing only when Rose's competitors could have pur-
chased gravel at distant quarries for prices substantially less than those
which Dooley charged Rose.21 Rose thus secured a cheap supply of
stone and a preferred position for cement manufacture through the price
differential.22 It is this differential which is important, not the prices
themselves.
Indeed, North Carolina precedent exists to support a finding of
illegal discrimination. In Shute v. Shute2" the supreme court consid-
20. Inclusion of the restriction on prices to other customers provides the basis for
distinguishing Rose from a factually similar case in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court
held that a contract authorizing lower prices to one customer than to all other customers
did not violate the Unfair Practices Act of Utah, UTAH CODE § 16A-4-3(a) (1943)
(now UTAH CODE § 13-5-3(a) (1953)), a statute containing provisions similar to the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 106 Utah 156,
146 P.2d 203 (1944).
21. The competitive positions of all purchasers will be exactly equal when the mar-
ket price for stone plus transportation costs equals the contract price between Dooley
and Rose. However, the spread resulting from transportation costs may be substantial.
Goods that are heavy or bulky have relatively high transportation costs. At some point
it becomes more profitable to build a new plant than to ship these products. As a result,
regional monopolies or oligopolies are created. This trend towards monopolization is
accelerated when the industry depends on a resource that is available only in certain
areas. Therefore, the supply of crushed stone and the transportation costs of cement
have been the prime factors in the creation of a cement industry which is an accumu-
lation of regional oligopolies.
22. If the purpose of the arrangement had only been to assure the Plaintiff
a favorable price, it would have been sufficient to set out the price at which
Plaintiff could buy stone and there would have been no need to provide in the
agreement that Dooley would not sell to other customers at prices less than
those provided for. However, by providing for price discrimination between
the Plaintiff and other customers, the agreements became an unreasonable re-
straint upon trade and contrary to public policy.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, vol. 15, at 10, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C.
App. 695, 190 S.E.2d 719 (1972).
23. 176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918). Other jurisdictions have cases legally simi-
lar to Shute. For example, in Clark v. Needham, 125 Mich. 84, 83 N.W. 1027 (1900),
the Michigan Supreme Court considered the practical consequences of a lease of manu-
facturing machinery and voided the contract. The lessor did not intend to use the ma-
chinery. Rather, the lease was an indirect method for creating a monopoly. In addi-
tion, when the contract was voided, no unjust enrichment resulted because the machinery
was returned to the lessee. These factors make the case factually similar to Rose.
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ered actual economic effects and motives in describing the sale of a
cotton gin as an illegal division of marketing territories. However, in
Rose the supreme court refused to follow Shute. By strictly construing
the jurisdictional requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act and of sec-
tion 75-5(b) (5) of the North Carolina General Statutes,24 the court
precluded the application of either statute.2 5
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AS A "RESTRAINT OF TRADE"
The supreme court also considered the broader question of
whether price discrimination was a "restraint of trade" under North
Carolina General Statute section 75-1,26 a copy of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.2 7 Although section 75-1 has a federal parentage, the scope
of the statute is not necessarily defined by federal precedent. The
court outlined its own procedure for analysis because of legislative
failure to define "restraint of trade. 2
8
24. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
25. The defendant contended that State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742,
188 S.E. 412 (1936) supported the application of section 75-5(b)(5). Brief for Defend-
ant-Appellant, vol. 15, at 12, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190 S.E.
2d 719 (1972). While a territorial division was in issue in Atlantic Ice, the court's deci-
sion in that case was based on section 75-5(b) (3), not on section 75-5(b) (5).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1965) provides: "Combinations in restraint of trade
illegal.-Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North Carolina is hereby declared to
be illegal. .. ."
27. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 655, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530 (1973).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
28. The method of analysis chosen by the court appears to be logical on its face.
Factual and legal evaluations of trade restraints are to be analyzed relative to a spectrum
of judicial applications which runs from common-law definitions to federal interpreta-
tions of the Sherman Act The court implied that an integral part of the Rose decision
would be to determine the position of North Carolina antitrust law on this continuum.
However, the court used this outline only in form, not in substance.
The court maintained that the defendant had attempted to define price discrimina-
tion as a per se offense, a contention that exceeded the judicially defined scope of the
Sherman Act. Nevertheless, an attempt to balance the interests of the parties was pre-
cluded by the court's specifications of the burden of proof. See notes 40-43 infra. Thus,
the North Carolina Supreme Court was not forced to determine the scope of restraint
of trade under the "rule of reason."
In determining that no violation existed, the court took the narrowest view possible
of its own procedure for analysis. The court refused to consider the effect of the special
standards established in the Robinson-Patman Act on Sherman Act coverage. See 1 R.
CALLmANN, THn LAw oF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES 335 (3d
ed. 1967). Application of the Sherman Act was thus considered only in a situational
context (relative to offenses previously attacked by judicial application) rather than in
a policy context (relative to the logic for applying rules of analysis). Consequently,
the court violated a policy established by the United States Supreme Court for interpret-
ing the Sherman Act: "That statute is aimed at substance rather than form." United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). In addition, this difference cannot
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G.S. 75-2 says that "[a]ny . . . contract . . . in restraint
of trade or commerce which violates the principles of the common
law is hereby declared to be a violation of § 75-1." Thus, the
common law on restraint of trade is determinative of at least the
minimum scope of G.S. 75-1. And, the body of law applying the
Sherman Act, although not binding upon this court in applying G.S.
75-1, is nonetheless instructive in determining the full reach of that
statute.29
The federal courts have not analyzed price discrimination as a re-
straint of trade under the Sherman Act because such cases have been
decided under the more specialized provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.30 Thus, in the absence of federal authority, the supreme court
turned its attention to common-law precedent on "restraints of trade."' '
Although every restraint of trade was illegal under the original,
common-law rule, this rule has been modified. If the restraint is intro-
duced to protect the consideration exchanged by the parties and its
scope is reasonably restricted in time and place, it may be upheld.
These restrictions are auxilliary elements in the creation of the agree-
ment; their use is "ancillary" to the primary purpose of the agree-
ment.32  A "rule of reason" was used to evaluate these restrictions.5 3
be classified merely as structural analysis. See Mueller, The New Antitrust: A "Struc-
tural" Approach, 12 VmL. L. Rnv. 764 (1967). Nevertheless, even if Rose had accepted
the policy arguments, the refusal of the court to acknowledge an obvious discrimination
as sufficient proof was a gap that could not be bridged by any logical statement.
This judicial maneuvering precluded consideration of the Sherman Act. Under its
own common-law powers, the North Carolina Supreme Court in effect dictated that the
common law on restraints of trade would become the standard of application for section
75-1. This section thus adds nothing to the prohibitions in section 75-2.
29. 282 N.C. at 655, 194 S.E.2d at 530.
30. Theoretically, the Sherman Act could have been used to attack price discrimi-
nation. Dixon, Price Discrimination and the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SEc-
nON 13 (1965). However, Congress created a special standard under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act, reads:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved are in commerce,
. and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
(emphasis added). The "substantial effect" standard of the Act seems to place this test
between the standards of the "rule of reason" and the per se rule. Rudolf Callmann
gives a more precise explanation.
While the Sherman Act condemns certain acts as illegal by virtue of their
intended purpose, a Clayton Act violation ex hypothesi requires proof that the
challenged act will have, or is likely to have, the prohibited effect. Thus, the
measure of legality under the Clayton Act is whether the defendant's conduct
is likely to diminish competition substantially.
1 R. CALLmANN, supra note 28, at 330. For application of this standard see United
Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
926 (1966); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. The distinction between ancillary and non-ancillary restraints is not solely
142 [Vol. 53
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According to the North Carolina Supreme Court, non-ancillary trade re-
strictions do not protect the exchange of consideration, but establish
special economic advantages. These restraints will not be analyzed for
their reasonableness. Rather, they will be considered per se illegal.14
The supreme court in Rose applied the "rule of reason" to the
alleged price discrimination even though this restraint was not recog-
nized at common law. The court's use of this rule was probably based
on its intuition of the probability that the activity would restrain trade.
Per se offenses generally have high probabilities of restricting competi-
tion, while only a moderate possibility for such restriction exists with
ancillary restraints. The court simply assumed -that only a moderate
probability of illegality exists with price discrimination.
The court's application of the "rule of reason!' is supported by
pragmatic economic policy. Price changes normally can be applied as
a dynamic force to increase competition. However, this power, when
combined with substantial financial strength, can be used to create
based on the purposes for which the restrictions are created. The effects of ancillary
restraints, often used in employment contracts and in contracts for the sale of goodwill,
are felt primarily by the parties directly involved in the transaction. On the other hand,
non-ancillary restraints have significant effects on third parties in the market. See note
19 supra. Interestingly, price discrimination generally has been attacked under statutory
schemes which have invalidated non-ancillary restraints. For a general discussion of an-
cillary and non-ancillary restraints in North Carolina see Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair
Trade Practices in North Carolina-Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C.L. RV. 199
(1972).
Specific aspects of the North Carolina statutes as well as the common law doc-
trines have been separately analyzed in other articles. See Breckenridge, Restraint of
Trade in North Carolina, 7 N.C.L. Rlv. 249 (1929); Note, Partial Enforcement of Re-
strictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. Rv. 689 (1972); Comment, Consumer Protection and
Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REV. 896
(1970); Comment, Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. Rav. 856
(1968); Note, Covenants Not to Compete, 38 N.C.L. REv. 395 (1960).
33. The "rule of reason" was formulated by the Supreme Court in Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In applying this standard, the Court was
attempting to balance potential benefits and harms of the challenged activities. For a
thorough analysis of this method of evaluation see Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in
Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964).
34. Various activities have been deemed per se unlawful under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts,
and tying arrangements. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See
generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); von Kalinowski, The "Per Se" Doctrine-An Emerg-
ing Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 569 (1964) (fear of inappropriate
expansion and reliance on the per se rule); Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-
Fixing-Sans Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. Cm. L. Rav. 837 (1952). North Caro-
lina has also used the per se rule to evaluate conduct and to enforce its antitrust laws.
State v. Craft, 168 N.C. 273, 83 S.E. 772 (1914). See Aycock, supra note 32, at 213-
14.
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monopolies and to restrain trade.3 5 The legality of price discrimination
thus depends on the particular factual situation.
No precise mechanism exists to determine when the "rule of
reason" or the per se rule should be applied. However, where the ben-
efits of discrimination are recognized and occur frequently, the flexi-
bility afforded by the "rule of reason" allows the beneficial aspects of
that conduct to be utilized more fullyY For that reason the balancing
test of the "rule of reason" is preferable to the absolute standard of
the per se rule for cases of price discrimination.
Before the "rule of reason" can be applied, however, the burdens
of proof must be allocated. When a party attempts to enforce an agree-
ment containing an ancillary restraint, he must demonstrate the reason-
ableness of the restraint as part of his prima facie case.87 However,
Rose decided that in price discrimination cases the party alleging the
illegality must prove the unreasonableness of the restraint.88 Thus,
price discrimination is held analogous to ancillary restraints for purposes
of applying the "rule of reason" apparently because of the court's as-
sumption that under the probability test both concepts offer an equal
probability of causing harm. However, the court did not consider them
analogous for purposes of allocating the burden of proof.8 9
35. Congress apparently recognized the potentiality of both benefit and harm when
it enacted Robinson-Patman in which price discrimination was not made a per se of-
fense. Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1956). But see
Wood, Antitrust Policy: a View from Corporate Counsel, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTI-
TRUST PoLicy 368, 387 (A. Phillips ed. 1965) (claiming the "substantially lessen"
standard of Robinson-Patman is really closely analogous to the per se rule in its opera.
tion). One criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act has been the element of rigidity
which it has introduced into the market. Austern, Problems and Prospects in Antitrust
Policy-I, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTrRuST POLICY 3, 26 (A. Phillips ed. 1965).
36. Many states have statutory or constitutional provisions which make restrictive
agreements and contracts automatically void. North Carolina does not have such a pro-
vision. J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 75 (1964) (citing
relevant state statutes and criticizing these automatic provisions).
37. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944). However, this is not an
excessive burden. The court in such cases has been concerned primarily with the time
and the area of the restriction which is often shown on the face of the agreement. That
showing was seemingly made in Rose.
38. 282 N.C. at 657, 194 S.E.2d at 531.
39. In addition, the probability test unfortunately omits one important element
from its analysis, the comparative frequency or severity of these two concepts. If ancil-
lary restraints are more frequent and more severe than price discriminations, the court
arguably distributed the burden of proof properly. The court is simply favoring the par-
ties opposing the more serious restriction. However, the court gave no indication that
it considered this question. It only stated a conclusion. Of course, the supreme court's
allocation of the burden may simply be a method used to avoid consideration of price
discrimination.
1974] PRICE DISCRIMINATION 145
Viewed from another perspective, the Rose decision can be
treated as another example of the problems and confusion that
accompany defensive pleadings in antitrust cases.40  Although the
same prima facie standards should apply to both offensive and defen-
sive uses of the statutes,41 courts have been unreceptive to defensive
attempts to complicate simple litigation. Nevertheless, because an offen-
sive user of the statutes must only prove a discrimination and injury,
it seems inequitable to require a defensive user to prove an unreasonable
discrimination and injury.4 2 Unfortunately, this prejudice is not unique
to the North Carolina Supreme Court. This affliction has surfaced
even in the highest federal court.43
40. The complex problems of proof encountered when antitrust violations are
pleaded as a defense may be traced to congressional failure to specify the defensive scope
of the Sherman Act. The importance of the conflicting policies-the need to discourage
antitrust violations with a uniform method of interpretation versus the equity of avoiding
unjust enrichment-has prevented even the United States Supreme Court from outlining
clear rules of interpretation. Sobel, Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions: A Ques-
tion of Policy Priorities, 16 ANTIRusT BULL. 455 (1971).
Creation of the antitrust defense is an extension of the common-law doctrine of
contract illegality based on violations of public policy. Lockhart, Violation of Anti-
Trust Law as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1947) (first major
analysis of the defense problem with an excellent historical review). See generally
Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
758 (1960).
41. Under the guise of "unreasonableness," the North Carolina Supreme Court
seems to have applied a "substantial effect' standard, a derivative of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. If this was done, however, the same prima facie requirements should have
been transferred to plaintiffs. F. RowE, supra note 14, at 109 (distribution of the bur-
den of proof under Robinson-Patman). However, the court did not account for the spe-
cialized wording of the Robinson-Patman Act. Although the analogy between the "sub-
stantial effect" standard and the "rule of reason" may be viable, the court's ruling on
the burden of proof encounters serious obstacles when N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(7)
(1965) is applied since the possibility for applying a per se rule exists under that sec-
tion. See Aycock, supra note 32, at 216-17.
42. The morass of conflicts created by judicial explanations has produced sugges-
tions for reform. One writer has proposed that the relative guilt or innocence of the
parties involved should be the determining factor in the allocation. Comment, The De-
fense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions: A Suggested Rationale, 15 U. KAN.
L. REv. 183 (1966). Nevertheless, such a policy merely substitutes one problem of bal-
ancing for another and is thus not a substantial improvement. Another suggestion in-
corporates the policy considerations of equity and antitrust enforcement into procedural
requirements. The use of rebuttable presumptions, when combined with the "rule of rea-
son," creates not only a uniform pattern of analysis for all types of restraints, but also
distributes the burden of proof more equitably. Note, A Suggested Role for Rebuttable
Presumptions in Antitrust Restraint of Trade Litigation, 1972 DUKE L.. 595. The ma-
jor problem with this method is that it complicates an otherwise simple contract action.
However, the pleading of the antitrust violation in its present form is an even greater
complication.
43. The reasons for avoiding analysis can be seen clearly in Supreme Court cases
attempting to resolve the problem. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); A.B. Small Co. v. Lambomn
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CONTRACT SEVERANCE TO Avom STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The problems raised by allocation of proof for defensive pleadings
are complicated by the use of the "rule of reason." The pleadings and
proof demanded by the court to satisfy the prima facie standard become
the minimum interests which the court is allowed to balance. Increases
in the prima facie standard of the burden of proof only narrow the range
of analysis for which the "rule of reason" would be applicable.
Nevertheless, another statutory solution, section 75-5(b)(7), was
available to the North Carolina Supreme Court that would not have pre-
sented such problems of interpretation. 44 However, the court disposed
of the applicability of this provision in a most unusual manner.
Perhaps the portion of the contract purporting to fix the minimum
price at which customers other than plaintiff could buy stone is
illegal price fixing under G.S. 75-1 and G.S. 75-5(b)(7) ...
But we do not decide this question since the invalidity of this por-
tion would not affect the validity of those portions of the contract
establishing the price at which plaintiff could buy.45
The court seems to have manufactured a mystical basis for
severance. By its very nature, price discrimination involves a minimum
of two sales and two buyers. 6 No discrimination can occur when all
sales are made to one party. The unreasonableness of sales to other
purchasers is evaluated not by absolute price but by their relation to
prices charged to the favored buyer. The attack is on the differen-
tial-the discrimination-and not on the prices themselves. The
court's use of severance implies a judicial misunderstanding of the
offense. Thus, perhaps, the purpose for using severability was the re-
luctance of the court to interpret section 75-5(b) (7), which appears
applicable to the facts in Rose and is not limited by grammatical
construction as is section 75-5 (b) (5).47
& Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925); Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212
U.S. 227 (1909); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b) (7) (1965) states as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided by article 10 of chapter 66, entitled
"Fair Trade," while engaged in buying or selling any goods in this State to
make, enter into, execute or carry out any contract, obligation or agreement
of any kind by which the parties thereto or any two or more of them bind
themselves not to sell or dispose of any goods or any article of trade, use or
consumption, below a common standard figure, or fixed value, or establish or
settle the price of such goods between them, or between themselves and others,
at a fixed or graduated figure, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free
and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or con-
sumers in the sale of such goods.
45. 282 N.C. at 658, 194 S.E.2d at 531 (emphasis by the court).
46. See notes 9-10 supra.
47. Section 75-5(b)(7) does not require sales in two different areas and does not
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The failure of the supreme court to consider section 75-5 (b) (7)
removed a major interpretive obstacle; the court was not forced to
consider whether the "rule of reason" or the per se rule would be used
to interpret section 75-5(b) (7). Strictly construed, the per se rule
should be applied. The special federal standard for evaluating price
discrimination is demanded by the restrictive wording of -the Robinson-
Patman Act,48 but section 75-5(b)(7) has no such restrictive lan-
guage.4" In addition, other sections of chapter 75, not influenced by the
"restraint of trade" limitation of section 75-1, have been regarded as
per se offenses.50 On the other hand, federal experience with problems
of interpretation and enforcement in cases of price discrimination might
imply that the "rule of reason' is to be used, apart from the wording of
the Robinson-Patman Act. However, to be consistent, the court should
use federal precedent under Robinson-Patman. If federal interpreta-
tions had been applied, the activities of the parties in Rose could have
been held illegal.51
FUTURE APPLICATION OF ROSE
The manner in which the court disposed of Rose renders it a
highly technical and limited decision on price discrimination. If price
discrimination is pleaded as a defense, the party claiming the dis-
crimination must prove the unreasonableness of the discrimination
under section 75-1. When the court is subsequently faced with an of-
fensive assertion of a restraint, it will have two available avenues for
review consistent with Rose. On the one hand, Rose can be disting-
uished as a defensive pleading case, and the court can thus hold that
price discrimination is covered by either section 75-1 or section 75-5
limit its application to sellers. Aycock, supra note 32, at 215-16. See notes 10 & 44
supra.
48. 1 R. CALLmANN, supra note 28, at 947.
49. Aycock, supra note 32, at 216-17 (contention that section 75-5(b)(7) should
use the per se rule for interpretation).
50. Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C. 38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938) (section 75-5
(b)(3)); Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant, 165 N.C. 453, 81 S.E. 606 (1914) (section
75-5(b) (2)).
51. The original problem that prevented the supreme court from applying the Rob-
inson-Patman Act was a lack of jurisdiction created by the defendant's failure to offer
proof of an interstate sale. The court never reached the issue of whether competition
was in fact substantially lessened. This factual question should form the core of a
prima facie case under Robinson-Patman; however, as a practical matter, few cases have
meticulously analyzed the difference between "substantial" and "inconsequential," especi-
ally as a means for dismissing a suit. F. RowE, supra note 14, at 132. The requirement
has been weakened by expansive decisions of the federal courts. See, e.g., Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
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(b) (7). The plaintiff in that situation will merely be required to prove
the offense and the injury.
On the other hand, the court might extend the severance theory
of Rose. Offensive and defensive application of antitrust statutes in
North Carolina would be relatively consistent, except for some distinc-
tions in the burden of proof. Effectively, North Carolina would have
no price discrimination statute. The legislature would have to express
a clear intent to attack price discrimination by enacting another statute.
The preferred course of action would be the application of an
existing statute, section 75-5(b)(7). This statute can be interpreted
as a broadly worded provision attacking price discrimination.52 Of
course, this choice would mean the abandonment of the severance
option used in Rose. Distinguishing the Rose case as a decision on
defensive pleading is not entirely satisfactory; nevertheless, the inequity
produced by pleading can be attacked separately in another case. The
issues of the Rose decision will be confusing enough for later
applications without offering numerous distinctions in a single court
opinion.
If the court does apply section 75-5(b) (7), it must face the
problem avoided by the Rose decision-whether to apply the "rule
of reason" or the per se rule. Although the statute specifically con-
demns agreements created "directly or indirectly to preclude a free and
unrestricted competition," the court could emphasize legislative use
of the verb "preclude." The court could find that the General As-
sembly intended to create a substantive standard requiring proof of
more than a mere discrimination, a test analogous to the "substantial
effect" standard of Robinson-Patman.58  The selection of "preclude"
arguably demands proof of some degree of exclusion by the discrimina-
tion. Such reasoning, it is true, does distort the wording of the statute,
52. Aycock, supra note 32, at 206-07, 215-16.
53. Any encouragement of a "substantial effect" standard must be prefaced by a
warning. While the rule delineates possible evaluations, it is still very difficult to apply.
Indeed, federal courts have experienced great difficulty in applying the Robinson-Patman
Act and have been condemned in many of their attempts. In addition, the reluctance
of the court in Rose to use existing mechanisms in the antitrust area will be present,
no matter what rule is applied.
Nevertheless, the "substantial effect" rule should prove beneficial. The demand for
proof of noticeable economic constrictions is generally one-sided, avoiding the flood of
information in cases using the "rule of reason." The requirement that the effects of
the restriction be demonstrated prevents repetitive pleadings of the statute for minor vio-
lations, a potential problem if a per se rule is applied. But see Austern, supra note 14;
Austern, supra note 35.
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but a per se interpretation may make the provision unpalatable for the
court.
Continued reliance on the severance theory demonstrates an
additional problem. The General Assembly has established an inte-
grated network of legislation condemning trade restrictions. However,
many of these provisions were enacted even though statutes existed
which covered the condemned conduct. 54  Like other state courts,
those in North Carolina have been reluctant to evaluate specialized
economic restraints. In order to avoid analyzing these economic
problems, the courts have abdicated their responsibility passing the inter-
pretive burden to the legislatures. In an era when potential restraints
of trade are as plentiful as gas pumps, 55 the judiciary must realistically
apply antitrust law. North Carolina needs a bolder state policy of
antitrust interpretation and enforcement 6 which only the courts can
provide.
Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.1 7 was far from the ideal case for an
analysis of price discrimination. The complications of defensive plead-
ing as well as the factual complexity of the lease distorted the issue
of price discrimination. Although the supreme court held that two anti-
trust provisions could not be applied, it did not positively restrict the
application of 75-5(b) (7). This omission may be the most significant
aspect of the case. Until a case comes before the court in which price
discrimination is pleaded by an offended party, North Carolina will
have only a technical, nondefinitive decision on price discrimination.
T. CARLTON YOUNGER, JR.
54. Aycock, supra note 32, at 215.
55. FTC, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETrrVE PRACTiCES iN THE MARKETING OF GASO-
LINE (1967).
56. Aycock, supra note 32, at 254. The problems of legislative construction and
judicial interpretation are not unique to North Carolina. The multiple problems pro-
duced by internally inconsistent state provisions and the lack of state enforcement have
produced various suggestions for reform. See Barron, California Antitrust-Legislative
Schizophrenia, 35 S. CAL. L. RFv. 393 (1962) (internal conflict of California laws);
Rabl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TExAs L. Rav. 753 (1961) (lack
of state enforcement); Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Com-
mentary on a Draft Statute, 39 TEXAs L. REv. 717 (1961) (problem for interstate corpo-
rations with the variation in state antitrust law). Note, The Present Revival and Future
Course of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575 (1963).
57. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
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